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THE IMF’s IMPRUDENT ROLE AS LENDER OF
LAST RESORT
Charles W. Calomiris
Throughouthistory, financial collapses havebeen defining moments
for public policy. Crises promote action, embodied in new financial
institutionsor policy doctrines. The motives that underlie such policies
are sometimes short-sighted—driven by short-run pressures rather
than long-run principles—and it is easier to enact unwise policy in
the midst of crisis than to reverse course after the crisis has passed,
after policies become embodied in institutions or statutes.
The responses by the IMF and the U.S. governmentto the Mexican
crisis of 1994—1995 and the recentAsian crises are examples ofdanger-
ous short-sightedness. In the wake ofthose crises, the Clinton Adminis-
tration is promoting anew doctrine ofglobal financial bailouts, admin-
istered through IMF largesse and conditions. If the IMF and U.S.
Treasury are permitted to prevail, the efficiency of global capital
markets will suffer, and the incidence and severity of financial crises
will grow.
The Mexican and Asian collapses follow a pattern dating back to
1982, and are the byproduct of fundamental flaws in the incentives
facing bankers in developingcountries. Incentives to assume excessive
risk result from the unhealthy partnerships between government and
business in many countries, which manifest themselves in taxpayer
bailouts of insolvent banks. International support for bank bailouts
will deepen that unhealthy partnership, and thus make the preexisting
problems in these countries even worse.
The uses of IMF assistance and the U.S. Treasury Department’s
Exchange Stabilization Fund to bail out insolvent emerging market
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banks and international bank lenders are not only improper (in the
sense that these sources of funds were not designed to be used in
this way); such assistance and the doctrine that underlies it are a
threat to the stability of the world financial system.
The suggestion that the IMF’s capital and facilities should be
expanded to permit it to engage in more such activity in the future
is troubling. The principal lesson of the recentbailout programs man-
aged by the IMF and the U.S. government (and the longer history
of generous domestic bailouts of banks in developing economies) is
the vital need for all parties (including host governments, the IMF
and the U.S. government) to find a credible way to commit not to
sponsor such counterproductive bailouts.
Why Are Bailouts Misguided?
A guiding principle of a well-functioning market economy is that
those who undertake risks should either lose or gain according to the
outcomes produced by those decisions. The idea that government, or
governments acting through the IMF, should absorb losses when risky
decisions turn out badly is fundamentally contrary to this guiding
principle of a free-market economy. This is, regrettably, precisely
what the IMF and the U.S. government are doing. While assistance
is often couched as “liquidity” assistance to resolve “balance of pay-
ments” problems, in fact assistance is designed to absorb the losses
of insolvent banks and their borrowers in developing economies, and
to insulate international lenders from the losses that they would other-
wise suffer.
What have been the costs of government absorption of financial
losses? Three kinds of costs figure prominently: (1) undesirable redis-
tributions of wealth from taxpayers to politically influential oligarchs
in developing economies; (2) the promotion of excessive risk taking
and inefficient investment; and (3) the undermining of the natural
process of deregulation and economic and political reform which
global competition would otherwise promote. I will explain each of
the three categories of cost in turn.
Bailouts Benefit the Politically Powerful at the
Expense of Others
The first undesirable consequence of these bailouts is the massive
redistribution of wealth away from taxpayers in emerging economies,
and toward the wealthy political cronies who control their countries’
industries and financial institutions, and whose imprudence precipi-
tates financial collapse.
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While bailouts entail loans from the IMF and foreign governments
atsubsidized interest rates to developing country governments, taxpay-
ers in the United States and other developed economies who pay the
subsidies associated with these loans are not the biggest losers from
the bailouts. The IMF andthe U.S. Treasury in most cases are repaid.
Loans from the IMF and the U.S. Treasury,however,provide powerful
justification for increased taxation to repay the loans. When the crisis
has passed, the big winners are the wealthy, politically influential risk
takers, and the biggest losers are the taxpayers in countries like Mexico
or Indonesia.
Mexico’s financial crisis of 1994—95—often seen as a“success story”
by the Clinton Administration—provides a case in point. During the
resolution of the Mexican banking collapse, the Mexican government
(throughits deposit insurance agency) purchased more than$45 billion
of baddebts from Mexican banks, half ofwhich are the debts of bank-
related conglomerates. The government promised (at the time) that
it would not absorb those debts permanently, and that it would hold
debtors responsible for paying their obligations. So far, it has done
virtually nothing to retrieve funds from borrowers liable for the debts
(Financial Times 1997: 2). Together with the nonperforming loans
remaining in Mexican banks, the total taxpayer exposure to loss from
the bailout of insolvent Mexican banks is estimated at 16 percent of
GDP. Thus, in addition to bailing out foreign and domestic bankers
who had lent funds to Mexican firms prior to the crisis, the likely
result of the Mexican bailout will be the transfer of billions of dollars
from Mexican taxpayers collectively to the country’s wealthiest and
most politically powerful enterprises and individuals. The economic
result of these taxes is more than a pure transfer to the rich; taxation
has also slowed recovery from the recession.
The bailout and redistribution of wealth in Mexico—like those
currently underway in Asia—was blessed by the IMF and the U.S.
government. In addition to lending money, the IMF and the U.S.
Treasury effectively lend respectability and external political impera-
tives to tax-and-transfer schemes to benefit the rich.
Some proponents of IMF bailouts argue, however, that by interven-
ing the IMF is able to promote fundamental structural reforms (in
particular, reforms to domestic banking systems) that reduce the
likelihood of future bailouts. The 1994—95 intervention in Mexico,
however, provides contrary evidence. In 1995, I was a member of a
World Bank team that provided advice to the Mexican government to
assist it in implementing its promised reform of the deposit insurance
system, whichwas part ofthe package ofproposed IMF-U.S. Treasury-
World Bank reforms. All deposits are 100 percent insured in Mexico,
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and this complete insurance has effectively subsidized high-risk bank
lending to powerful risk-taking conglomerates. (Insured depositors
have little incentive to question the use of their funds, which leaves
bankers free to make whatever use of the funds they please.) In
November 1995, we presented a detailed plan for reform to the
Mexican government that would have introduced a small element of
market discipline into the system and thus would have partially
removed some of the government subsidies enjoyed by the Mexi-
can banks.
Ostensibly, as a vaguely worded condition for the World Bank
to release $500 million in funds to the Mexican government, the
government had to agree to consider some version of the reforms we
were advocating. After a day of lip service (and the release of the
funds), one of the Mexican officials in charge took me aside and
expressed his appreciation for my efforts, and then told me that “of
course, the banks won’t let us do anyof this.” That was not a surprise;
whywould anyone want to give up a subsidy if theyhave the political
influence to maintain it?
So far, little has been done to introduce market discipline into the
Mexican banking system, and there is no reason to believe that any-
thing will be done to limit the current system of subsidizing the risks
of the industrial conglomerates andthe banks they control. According
to unofficial estimates, the overwhelming majority of domestically
owned Mexican banks are insolvent. On average, 40 percent of the
loans of domestic Mexican banks are not performing (even after having
shed large amounts of their non-performing loans via government
subsidized purchases).
The Mexican experience has made me suspicious of IMF financial
sector “conditionality.” I expect similar results from the current conch-
tions being attached to IMF assistance in Asia, where backsliding on
conditions has begun even earlier than in Mexico. It is very hard to
undermine the corrupt partnership between powerful industrialist-
bankers and governments by giving them both money in exchange
fDr promises to reform in the future. It is even harder to do so when
those conditions are specified in secret agreements—such secrecy
makes it impossible for any outside observer to evaluate the wisdom
of the conditions, or gauge acountry’s eventual compliancewith them,
which further weakens the incentives of recipient countries to comply.
Indonesia is now working on its third IMF bailout agreement,
after staring down the IMF on its two previous “agreements.” The
Economist (1998: 37) noted that “In January, Mr. Suharto promised
to dismantle many of the monopolies and cartels which control trade
in some products. But he seems to have forgotten to tell the monopo-
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lists: the plywood cartel, run by his former golfpartner.. . continues
to issue instructions to its members. Restructuring of the financial
system, awash with red ink, hasbarely begun.” Bymid-March, Suharto
had become openly defiant of the IMF. His insistence on a currency
board and his announced intention to appoint Mohamad Hasan, “the
biggest of the cronies,” as industry and trade minister, make it hard
even for the IMF to argue that conditions will be respected (Borsuk
1998: A12).
Korea’s leadership hasbeen much more cooperative with the IMF,
but here appearances may be deceiving. As Moon Ilhwan (1998:
54—55) noted in Business Week, President Kim “wants the banks to
stop lending to big companies at preferential rates. But just in the
past six weeks, banks have provided nearly $1 billion in ‘emergency
relief loans’ to sickly chaebol. . . . ‘The loans are offered at far below
market interest rates, and this is a distorted distribution of limited
resources,’ laments Lee Chae Kwang, head of research at Daiwa
Securities in Seoul.” IMF aid is being channeled to the banks, which
pass it along with impunity to the conglomerates that own them. Thus
in Korea, the IMF has not even been able to prevent the immediate
misuse of its funds, much less reform the long-term structure of bank-
industry relationships.
That is not to say that IMF conditions of all kinds always fail. The
IMF has been somewhat successful in getting countries to change tax
or expenditure policies, foreign trade policies, and monetary policies.
Banking policy is fundamentally different, however, for two reasons.
First, real reform in the banking system takes years to accomplish
because it entails new ways of measuring and managing risk, new
regulations, and new supervisory procedures. These changes are both
politically difficult (because the politically powerful must forego sub-
sidies) and technically challenging. The time horizon necessary to
implement successful reform is at least five years (judging from the
successful examples of Argentina and Chile, which did so very aggres-
sively and voluntarily). Building effective financial institutions, and
reformingthe legal andregulatory environmentin which theyoperate,
is a protracted and difficult learning process, even when countries
have the political will to do so. The horizon of IMF crisis assistance
and conditionality (typically two years or so) is simply not suited to
achieve true reform in the banking system.
Second, banks are controlled by powerful and concentrated vested
interests who are willing to fight hard to maintain their access to
subsidized credit and block those reforms. A basic principle of political
economyis that powerful minorities (in thiscase, ahandfulof conglom-
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erate-controlled banks) generallywill be successful in obtaining politi-
c;al favors paid for by fragmented majorities (the average taxpayer).
Thus in practice, crisis countries will always find it easy to promise
(but never deliver) true banking reform. Instead, they will tax quickly
arid deeply, pay backtheir loans to the IMF, replenish the poker chips
of their risk-loving conglomerates, and return to business as usual.
Another criticism of IMF conditions in Asia, as put forth by Martin
Feldstein (1998), is that they are inappropriately detailed and micro-
economic. Feldstein argues that it is inappropriate for an international
agency to intrude so deeply into domestic economic policy, especially
since its charter provides no mandate to do so. I agree with that view,
but I would hasten to add that the lesson is not that the IMF should
provide bailouts with fewer conditions. Rather, I would characterize
the new tendency ofthe IMF to intervene too deeply into the structure
of borrowing country economies as the natural result of overstepping
the agency’s original limits ofproviding assistance. The new intrusive-
ness reflects an unwise new goal (providing massive bailouts for insol-
vent financial institutions and international lenders), a noble hope (to
restructure the economies of recipients to prevent future dependence
on bailouts), and an unrealistic belief in the ability of such conditions
to succeed.
The Expectation of Bailouts Increases the Fragility
of the World Financial System
The predictable failure of government to allow losses to fall on
risk takers after financial crises not only produces a one-time wealth
transfer, but encourages behavior that will lead to a repeat of the
same problem in the future, which brings us to the second category
of costs resulting from bailouts.
If the risk-taking bankers know that future gains from taking on
risk will be private, but losses will be borne by taxpayers (again), that
amounts to a government subsidy for risk, which thereby encourages
excessive risk taking (the so-called moral-hazard problem).
In the United States, we learned during our Savings and Loan
debacle that subsidies for risk taking could lead to large losses from
unwise, high-risk investments. The losses to taxpayers from that experi-
ence (roughly 3 percent of 1990 GDP), however,were smallcompared
to what has been happening in developing economies over the past
]L5 years—an era that has seen an unprecedented epidemic of high-
cost bank insolvency. Studies by the World Bank and the IMF have
documented some 90 episodes of severe banking crisis since 1982.
In more than 20 of those cases, the bailout costs to developing country
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governments have exceeded 10 percent of GDP. In roughly half of
those cases (including the estimated losses of some of the current
Asian-crisis countries) losses have been in the range of 25 percent of
their GDP (see Caprio and Klingabiel, 1996a, 1996b; and Lindgren,
Garcia, and Saal 1996).
These facts warrant emphasis. This string of enormous losses is
unprecedented, and is occurring during a relatively stable period of
positive global economic growth. Losses to depositors in the United
States during the Great Depression, for example, were comparatively
small. National banks (the only banks for which depositor loss data
are readily available) issued 47 percent of U.S. bank deposits (FDIC
1940: 66). Losses tonational bank depositors from bank failures during
the worst four years of the Depression (1930, 1931, 1932, and 1933)
together amounted to only 1.9 percent of average U.S. GNP over
those years (GNP data are from Economic Report of the President
1968: 218). Assuming similar loss rates to depositors of national and
state-chartered banks would imply an estimated loss on all deposits
of roughly 4 percent of GDP. Losses during other historical periods
of the most severe economic crises—the 1830s, the 1850s, and the
1890s—also pale by comparison to the experience of the last 15 years.
Indeed, in many countries historically, severe recessions have not
been associated with any significant losses to depositors (Bordo 1985,
Calomiris 1993).
What can explain the enormity of loss since 1982? Surely not
“shocks” of unprecedented magnitude (like oil price hikes, wars, or
global downturns in demand), since such influences have been absent
during this period. The explanation for the new epidemic ofworldwide
banking instability is the roller coaster of risk produced by the choices
of banks in developing economies—choices that are the byproduct
of government subsidies for risk-taking.
Why are banks behaving so differently now from the way they
behaved previously? The answer is simple. Prior to the 1980s, banking
systems did not subsidize risk nearly as much as they do now. The
wave ofpartial economic and financialliberalization that swept through
the developing world in the 1980s and 1990s has been enormously
beneficial in many ways, but it should not be confused with true
economic liberalization. While many countries have opened them-
selves to world trade, have privatized many important sectors of their
economies (including their financial sectors), and have moved away
from direct governmental control of domestic credit, a key flaw in
the new era of liberalization has been an expanded, and unhealthy,
partnership between government and private business.
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Private business in many developing economies is dominated by
oligopolistic conglomerates, often controlled by a small minority of
wealthy, politically influential families or corporations. At the center
of the unhealthy partnership between government and business in
many developing countries is a new kind of bank—what I call the
quasi-public bank. Quasi-publicbanks (typically owned and controlled
by conglomerates) are private institutions with an implicit claim to
public resources (which pay for their losses). They are a key instrument
of domestic economic control for conglomerates, and a key vehicle
for the transfer of political patronage from the government to these
conglomerates.
Prior to the l980s, banks in developing countries were often state-
owned institutions, or private banks subject to strict controls that
limited private allocation of credit. That system was highly inefficient
and limited private sector access to funds. It was replacedby a “privat-
ized” banking systemwith a different set of inefficiencies—an unnatu-
rally risky form of bank “privatization” that brought freedom without
responsibility. When quasi-public banks (and their parent conglomer-
ates) make profits, they keep them; when they suffer losses, the public
pays for them (through bank bailouts). That is a formula for encourag-
ing banks to take on extreme risk.
Quasi-public banks don’t always choose to take extreme risk, how-
ever, and that explains why they sometimes can survive successfully
for years before imposing such large costs on taxpayers. But they are
extremelyfragile institutions, and they magnify risk for the rest of the
economy, particularly during recessions. These banks turn normal
economies into a house of cards—one which collapses in the face of
even moderate-sized adverse shocks.
The key to understanding how quasi-public institutions magnify
economic risk is toconsider how they respond to initial lossesproduced
by adverse shocks to their borrowers. Normal private banks experienc-
ing loan losses tend to reduce their portfolio risk to restore the confi-
dence of their depositors and limit the risk of bank failure. But quasi-
public institutions need not concern themselves with the risk offailure,
since bank depositors and stockholders are all insured against loss by
taxpayers. In the wake of losses, these banks face opposite incentives—
to channel ever riskier loans to their conglomerates.
Financial crises in these economies tend to go through three stages:
(1) initial losses, followed by purposeful increases inbank lending risk;
(2) consequent increases in the probability of devaluation, followed by
purposeful increases by banks in their currency risk; and (3) large
devaluation, followed by enormous losses to banks and taxpayers. The
consistency ofthis pattern inuncanny. It was first visible in the Chilean
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collapse of 1982—83 (that experience has been described in detail by
the former Chilean minister of finance in de la Cuadra and Valdes
1992). The same pattern was followed in Mexico in 1994—95, and in
Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea in the recent crisis.
The sequence is disturbingly predictable. First, as initial losses of
borrowers and their banks mount, banks and their borrower-owners
increase credit and thus pursue higher-risk resurrection strategies.
The initial recessionary shock that hits these economies raises the
probability of devaluation (slightly, initially). The resultant increase
in bank risk makes devaluation more likelybecause ofthe link between
expected bank losses and future government money supply increases.
Second, increased risk of banking collapse means a greater chance
of a government bailout of bank losses. Since those losses are often
in the range of 10 or 20 percent of GDP, the implications of these
potential losses for government expenditure and money supply
increases make drastic devaluation a real possibility.
The high probability of devaluation provides banks and their bor-
rower-owners a new opportunity for profitable risk taking in the form
of currency risk. As the risk of devaluation grows, the interest rate
difference between local currency-denominated debt and dollar-
denominated debt rises (reflecting the expectation of a devaluation).
Now banks and their borrower-owners face the choice between
domestic-denominated borrowing—which has a high current cost,
but no currency risk—and foreign-denominated borrowing—which
has a low current cost, but a risk of loss following a devaluation (when
the value of hard-currency debts can rise astronomically). Because
the banks and their owner-borrowers know they will be bailed out by
the government if a devaluation occurs, they prefer to borrow via
low-interest rate, dollar-denominated debt, and need not worry about
the enormous losses they will suffer from a devaluation.
Third, the more the economy increases its dollar-denominated bor-
rowing, the more likely it will be unable to meet those hard-currency
obligations. Thus devaluation becomes moreandmore likely over time.
That, in short, is howquasi-public banks have turned many develop-
ing economies into the riskiest financial systems the world has ever
seen. Indeed, several former government officials in these economies
have issued what amount to “public confessions” that document exactly
this pattern (notably the central bank president of Venezuela, Ruth
de Krivoy [1995], and the finance minister of Chile, Sergio de Ia
Cuadra). Consider de Ia Cuadra’s discussion of the Chilean collapse.
As in many other countries, the adverse macroeconomic conse-
quences of the initial exogenous shocks to the Chilean economy made
it politically difficult to impose the necessary discipline on banks. As
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de laCuadra andValdes (1992: 75) argue, “The superintendency could
not include in its loan classification procedure a truly independent
assessment of the exposure of bank debtors to foreign exchange and
interest rate risk because such an assessment would have interfered
with official macroeconomic policies.”
IDe la Cuadra and Valdes go on to trace how excessive risk taking
by banks and firms, and eventual losses from those risks, produced
economic devastation by 1982 and increasingly perverse incentives
for lenders. Their discussion warrants recounting in detail:
In 1981 most banks saw their effective capital plummet further as
soon as optimistic debtors became less willing to pay when the
net worth of their corporations fell. This reluctance reinforced the
previous perverse incentives to banks, so that banks became even
more willing to assume credit risks derived from exchange rate and
interest rate risks.
By 1981 financing decisions by Chilean firms and banks reflected
a tie facto government guarantee to the private sector for foreign
exchange risk. Ouranalysis has identified the superintendancy’s lack
of penalization of credit risk in its loan classification criteria as the
channel for the guarantee.
The outcome of this structural contingent subsidy was that many
small and medium-sized businesses got deeply into debt in 1981.
Debts to banks increased during 1981 from 37.6 percent to 50.4
percent of GDP in response to the rise in real interest rates.
By mid-1982 the fall in CDP was so steep that it took on the
character of a depression. In June 1982 the government finally
decided to devalue the exchange rate by 14 percent.. . . By the end
of 1982 the losses that the devaluations had inflicted on the holders
of dollar-denominated debts had created insolvency among firms
of all sizes.
The sorry state of most debtors caused delinquent loans to rise
from 2.34 percent of loans in December 1981 to 3.83 percent in
February 1982 and 6.31 percent in May. Most delinquent loans
turned out to be 100 percent losses, so they reduced the net worth
of banks.
On July 12, 1982, the central bank decided to allow banks to
defer their losses over several years, so it began to buy the banks’
delinquent loan portfolios at face value. The banks, however, had
to promise to repurchase the portfolios at face value over lime with
100 percent of their profits, so the scheme did not improve bank
solvency by itself It solved a liquidity problem butalso set the stage
for making good the implicit contingent subsidy that the government
had offered to speculators in 1981 IDe la Cuadra and Valdes
1992: 79—80].
De la Cuadra and Valdes emphasize that loans to industrial firms
that were linked to banks via conglomerates were especially forthcom-
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ing from banks as a consequence of the government subsidization of
risk. Thus despite its free-market orientation and stated commitment
to private discipline in banking, Chile ended up insuring “uninsured”
claims on banks, subsidizing high-risk resurrection strategies on the
part of its banks, and passing on enormous risk-encouraging credit
subsidies to industrial firms with close links to banks.
The Chilean pattern was repeated in Mexico in 1994—95. Initial
bank loan losses were aggravated by currency devaluation’s effects
on Mexican firms that had undertaken dollar-denominated debts.
Furthermore, Mexican banks, like those in Chile in 1982, had bet
heavily against devaluation. Despite the fact that Mexican banking
regulations prohibited banks from assuming currency risk, as the peso
devalued Mexican banks suffered large losses from illegal “structured
note” agreements they had entered into with American banks (dis-
cussed in Garber 1997).
In the recent Asian crises, Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia also have
seen enormous increases in their dollar-denominated debts over the
past year—after recessionary shocks and bank losses were widely
known. In the case of Korea, as early as the end of 1996, its chaebols
had averaged debt-equity ratios of 400 percent. As exports fell in
1997, debt rose even further (Woodall 1998: 6).
By June 1997, foreign bank debt had grown to 45 percent of GDP
in Thailand, 35 percent of GDP in Indonesia, and 25 percent of GDP
in Korea, most of which was short-term debt. By June 1997, South
Korea’s short-term debt was three times its foreign reserves (ibid.:
6). The devaluations of recent months (in combination with the prior
pursuit of low-interest dollar-denominated funds) have produced an
enormous burden on the taxpayers of these countries who now must
repay the dollar-denominated debts at inflated exchange rates.
Ironically, some supporters of international bailouts—notably, Jef-
frey Sachs et al. (1995)—see the high dollar-denominated short-term
debt burdens of developing market economies as the “cause” of
“unwarranted” runs on their currencies which they claim produce
financial crises. According to that view, large amounts of short-term
foreign debt expose countries to the fickle preferences of foreign
speculators. That view is misleading for at least three reasons.
First, the run-up in short-term foreign debt is a symptom of weak-
ness (a characteristic of an economy that cannot attract long-term
debt) and indicative of the perverse risk-taking incentives of banks
and conglomerates that are willing to absorb massive amounts of
foreign currency risk at taxpayers’ expense.
Second, fickle foreign speculators are not the source of devaluation
pressure. Developing economies in which government and business
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are too closely linked tendto suffer two kinds of fundamentalproblems
which underlie devaluation pressures: low productivity growth, and
off-balance-sheet fiscal pressures resulting from weak banking sys-
tems. Because crony capitalism is highly inefficient, it produces low
long-term factor productivity growth, which can threaten the long-
term maintenance of a fixed exchange rate against the dollar. As Paul
Krugman (1994) and Alwyn Young (1995) noted of the “Asian tigers”
years ago, their impressive growth resulted from combining large
amounts of savings with inexpensive unskilled labor, not high factor
productivity growth.
Fiscal pressures are also important. The off-balance-sheet liabilities
associated with costly bank bailouts imply the need to monetize gov-
ernment debts. Because these potential costs and their monetary
implications are anticipatedby markets, they canundermine the credi-
bility of the fixed exchange rate. A common error of many macroeco-
nomic analyses of exchange rate collapses in Asia and Mexico is the
tendency to focus only on the official government deficit, ignoring
the enormous costs of bank bailouts.
The Sachs viewis alsowrong to identify foreign funds as the primary
sources of balance-of-payments outflows. In many cases (as the IMF’s
report on the Mexican crisis made clear) foreigners are not the ones
who initiate the run on the currency. Well-informed domestic market
participants often are the first to flee once it becomes clear that
devaluation is imminent.
To What Extent Are the IMF and the U.S.
Government Magnifying Moral Hazard?
My review of the moral-hazard consequences of bailouts over the
past 15 years has emphasized that domestic governments have often
been the most important source ofperverse incentives for their banks.
Where does the IMF fit in? The main influences of the IMF and the
U.S. government in the 1990s have been to aggravate the problem
in two ways: (1) to lend legitimacy to (and thus facilitate) domestic
bailouts by providing conditions that call for taxation of the domestic
middle class to repay the bridge loans from the IMF and the U.S.
government; and (2) to insulate foreign creditors (especially banks)
from losses during these crises.
Ofthe two influences, the second is the more pernicious. Insulating
foreign banks from loss (by ensuring that bailout packages also rescue
them) removes the incentive for foreign banks to avoid lending to
high-risk countries. That aggravates the moral-hazard problem by
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promoting the flow of dollar-denominated “hot money” during the
second and third stages of the financial crises outlined above.
In thisregard, consider the contrastbetween what creditors learned
from the Mexican crises of 1982 and 1994. In 1982 (in the wake of
adecline in oil prices andthe rise in U.S. interest rates) foreignlenders
to Mexican firms suffered enormous losses as the peso depreciated to
1/3 ofits pre-crisisvalue, making foreign-denominated debt unsustain-
able for many firms. For example, the workout of one of the largest
Mexican conglomerates, Crupo Alfa, entailed eventual losses to some
of its creditors in excess of 50 percent. Painful lessons were learned
by some of these creditors. Citibank in particular learned important
lessons about managing risk on its commercial lending in Mexico, and
managed its exchange and credit risk much better during the 1980s
and 1990s. During and after the crisis of 1994—1995, its losses were
far smaller than in 1982.
What will foreign banks learn from the 1994—95 Mexican crisis, or
the recent Asian crisis? I fear they are learning that they can lend
without fear of default because of the implicit protection of the IMF
and the U.S. Treasury, And it does not help matters that the IMF
and the Treasury are signaling their intent to provide future bailouts
by calling for ever-increasing amounts of IMF capital and new IMF
lending facilities. That, of course, will add fuel to the fire of risk-
taking in developing economies.
Undermining the Process of Economic Reform in
Developing Economies
The cost of insuring foreign lenders against loss runs even deeper,
however, which brings me to the third categoryof costs from bailouts.
Byinsuring foreign creditors who fuel developing economy risk taking,
the IMF and U.S. government are undermining the natural process
of reform in many emerging economies.
For developing economies true reform is a big step—one that
requires the fundamentalpolitical transformation from a domestically
oriented, rent-seeking society to one willing and able to participate
in the competitive global economy. Powerful local oligarchs often can
successfully block liberalization if they choose to do so. But the oli-
garchs may prefer true liberalization if theyprofit from it. The attrac-
tion of participating in the competitive global economy is that global-
ization offers greater access to foreign markets and foreign sources
of capital. That may lead powerful special interests to permit true
liberalization if it is the necessary path to globalization. Entrenched
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oligarchs may choose to liberalize in order to trade a large slice of a
small pie for a small slice of a much larger pie.
The incentives for oligarchs to liberalize can be strong if foreign
sources of capital are only willing to provide funds to economies with
appropriate capitalist infrastructures—that is, those which are based
on the rule of law, the protection of creditors and stockholders rights,
a predictable means of laying claim to title, an orderly bankruptcy
procedure, an intelligible system of accounting principles, a non-
confiscatory tax system, and fair competition in markets.
But IMF and U.S. government assistance can undermine the incen-
tives that encourage the liberalization process. If oligarchs can avoid
true liberalization but still maintain access to foreign capital, where
is the incentive for them to relinquish the rule of man in favor of the
rule of law, or to allow competition and democracy to flourish? If
foreign investors are protectedby the IMF and the U.S. government,
foreigners will be less discriminating about where they place their
funds, and thus provide less of an incentive for reform in developing
economies.
Thus, bailouts undermine the natural process of reform that global
competition would otherwise promote. They do so not only by taxing
(andthus weakening) the emerging middle classes in developing coun-
tries (the segment of society most likely to push for real reform), but
by undermining the incentives of the existing oligarchs to permit
liberalization.
From some quarters one hears praise for IMF bailouts as a means to
political “stability” in developing economies. If the pursuit of stability
means tilting the balance to preserve corrupt rulers and undermine
democratic forces within developing economies, it becomes harder
to defend policies solely on the basis of the political stability that
accompanies them. I for one am very thankful that stability was not
the overriding objective of Americans in 1776.
Distinguishing Liquidity Crises from Solvency
Crises
Supporters of the IMF sometimes refer to its assistance as an
infusion of “liquidity.” While liquidity has nothing to do with financing
bank bailouts, liquidity assistance was the motive that gave rise to the
IMF as part of the Bretton Woods system. Traditionally (under the
pre-1973 Bretton Woods system) IMF intervention was supposed to
help bolster central bank reserves to preserve a fundamentally sound
exchange rate regime buffeted by “destabilizing speculation.”
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After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and throughout
the 1980s, the IMF’s role changed. It assumed the role of helping
mainly developing countries devalue in an orderly way, and establish
credibility in private markets. The IMF offered technical advice, and
monitored compliance with macroeconomic policy objectives. During
that period, one could argue that the IMF provided “liquidity” assis-
tance (rather than simplywealth transfers) in the sense that its policies
sometimes helped to restore credibility by reversing adverse trends
in the fundamental macroeconomic determinants that drove exchange
rate depreciation.
In the 1990s, the IMF has stretched the notion of “liquidity” assis-
tance beyond anyreasonable definition. IMF programs in Mexico and
Asia are now microeconoinic bailouts that restore the solvency of
clearly insolvent financial institutions. That objective has nothing to
do with bank or government liquidity, or with temporary imbalances
in the balance of payments.
These bank bailouts also havenothing todo with “panic prevention.”
In particular, there is no connection between current IMF programs
and the historical interventions by central banks or private coalitions
of banks to stem banking crises. (The history and theory of banking
panics, and the proper role of the lender of last resort, are reviewed
in Gorton 1985, Bordo 1990, Kaufman 1991, 1994, Calomiris 1990,
1993, 1994, 1997, Calomiris andGorton 1991, Calomiris and Schweik-
art 1991, and Calomiris and Mason 1997.) The current IMF bailout
policies are bridge loans in support of the large wealth transfers from
domestic taxpayers to recapitalize clearly insolvent financial institu-
tions and related parties. Historical lender-of-last-resort assistance
during banking panics, in contrast, was geared to prevent the failure
of solvent banks which were temporarily in need of cash to prevent
their unwarranted failure.
Given some of the recent concerns of a threat from “irrational
financial contagion” voiced by policy makers in the popular press, it
is worth emphasizing that the literature on the history and theory of
banking panics (cited above) demonstrates that panics have been
“rational” phenomena. Bank panics result from reasonable concerns
on the part of bank depositors, and are predictable historical phenom-
ena. Random, irrational attacks on financial systems are not evident
in financial history. Thus concerns of “irrational contagion” spreading
from one country to another without any fundamental explanatory
link connecting the countries are unwarranted. Such concerns should
not be used to justify financial bailouts. For example, there are clear
fundamental economic connections (notably export product competi-
tion) that have produced “spillover” effects across countries within
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Asia during the recent crisis. As during the Mexican crisis, not all
countries suffer from the fallout; the spillovers can be traced to eco-
nomic and financial linkages, not irrational contagion.
IMF bailouts cannot be justified by panic prevention, as that term
is properly defined. Nor could the IMF serve as an effective lender
oflast resort to the banking systems ofdeveloping economies. A lender
of last resort (whether private or public) must be in the position to
observe and control the uses of the funds it provides. Historically,
bank clearinghouse coalitions or central banks have been the lenders
of last resort.
There is no reason to believe that legitimate lender of last resort
protection to stem financial panics would be best achieved via IMF
or U.S. government intervention. Runs on banks are either the conse-
quence offears of impending devaluation (which central banks control
via monetary policy), or the consequence of confusion about default
risks within the banking system. In both cases, local authorities are
the proper institutions to deal with the problem (by resolving the
exchange rate uncertainty in the former case, or by deciding on the
appropriate lender-of-last-resort policy in the latter case).
In cases where lender-of-last-resort assistance is warranted, the
local central bank (unlike the IMF) has the information and legal
authority to enforce the necessary conditionson the behavior ofbanks
receiving such lending. Furthermore, those conditions may involve
long-run reforms of banking practices. As I argued before, the brief
time horizon of IMF involvement makes any attempt by the IMF to
achieve meaningful reform of the financial sector, as a condition for
assistance, virtually impossible. Financial sector reform is a process
that requires many years to design and implement. Countries that
have achieved successful banking reform have done so over many
years and as the result of a strong domestic commitment to improve
banks’ incentives, not in response to IMF conditions (Calomiris 1997).
The Current Asian Crisis and the Proposed Increase
in IMF Capital
If there is no respectable intellectual justification for the current
direction of IMF policy (as illustrated in Mexico and Asia), then why
are so many people coming out in support of expanding the IMF’s
capital andlending facilities? IfIMF-sponsoredbailouts areweakening
democracy, strengthening corruption, aggravating inequality and pov-
erty, and fostering systemic financial instability and industrial ineffi-
ciency, why are they so popular?
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I think part of the answer lies in the short-run fears of American
banks and businesses, which have led them to equate support for
expansion of the IMF with support for its programs in Asia. Many
U.S. banks and businesses would stand to lose if the current IMF
Asian bailouts were undermined. For many, the “long-run” appropri-
ateness of IMF policy is not the issue; their current exposure in Asia
is their overarching concern.
Of course, deciding not to expand the IMF’s capital would not in
any way undermine the IMF’s existing commitments in Asia. Rather,
it would only limit the IMF’s ability to expand such commitments in
the future, in Asia and elsewhere. Thus, I think much of the support
demonstrated for the IMF on the part of U.S. banks and businesses
is not only myopic, but misguided. There is no immediate threat to
Asia from limiting the ability of the IMF to expand in the future.
Policy Recommendations
The following are four specific recommendations that follow from
my analysis.
First, policymakers should recognize that IMF bailouts like those
provided in Mexico and Asia are counterproductive. The IMF can
best contribute to global financial stability by committing not to insu-
late foreignor domestic creditors from loss, The more that developing
countries are forced to handle their own financial insolvencies, and the
more foreign investors are forced to bear the costs of their investment
decisions, the more developing countries will be attracted by the
benefits of true liberalization. International “coordination” of assis-
tance to insolvent creditors is counterproductive to the stability and
efficiency of the global financial system.
Second, consequently, there is no reason to expand the IMF’s
capital or to develop the new proposed lending facility to provide
bailouts to financial systems in distress, Indeed, an expansion of IMF
capital or facilities would do real harm by signaling an intention to
strengthen and expand the IMF’s commitment to provide bailouts in
the future. The U.S. government should at the very least try to limit
the IMF to its pre-1994 goals of advising countries on their macroeco-
nomic policies (to improve exchange rate stability) and serving as an
international delegated monitor charged with tracking those policies
and providing credible information to global capital markets. The
IMF has more than enough capital to achieve those ends. It currently
has $45 billion to allocate, and within three years (after its Asian loans
have been repaid), it will have much more.
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The IMF and World Bank sometimes have been successful in
helping to identi!~and give credibility to regimes that are honestly
pursuing the path of reform. In my view, their expressions of support
for these regimes havebeen more important than the funds they have
contributed in support of those reforms. The IMF does not need to
use funds tobribe countries to restore balance to their macroeconomic
accounts or proper incentives to their banks, The IMF should place
its trust inglobal competition, which gives the most reliable encourage-
ment to true liberalization. Wise economic policies will be rewarded
by prosperity, and by global inflows of “unprotected” capital. In the
caseofbanking reform, bribery is not only unnecessary but ineffectual.
The IMF should recognize that it cannot control (and should not try
to control) the banking regulations of developing economies.
Third, denying the IMF its desired increases in capital and facilities,
and working to restrict its purview, are not enough to stop the trend
toward unwise expansion of global bank bailouts. Other means of
promoting bailouts must also be forsworn. Along with refusing to
expand the IMF’s capital, Congress should abolish the Exchange
Stabilization Fund—a legacy of the Great Depression which has no
legitimate role in U.S. monetary policy today. The Exchange Stabiliza-
tion Fund—originally created to “stabilize the exchange value of the
dollar” (Schwartz 1997: 135)—was the source of a $12 billion loan
to Mexico in January 1995. No one could plausibly argue that the
loan to Mexico was a form of exchange intervention in support of
the dollar. This was not the first time the Exchange Stabilization
Fund was used inappropriately. Indeed, as Anna Schwartz (1997)
documents, the history of the Exchange Stabilization Fund—contrary
to its statedpurpose—is rife with similar examples of abuse by previous
administrations.
The World Bank—which has been partially successful in providing
advice and support for long-term financial sector reform—should
also be prevented from serving as a substitute vehicle for bailouts.
Whatever assistance the World Bank provides should be limited to
gradual support promoting long-run reform of the financial sector.
For that purpose, sudden large flows of credit subsidies are unneces-
sary and counterproductive.Subsidizingprivatization ofbanks requires
only small annual flows of credit. Such funds should be distributed
only in response to credible government reforms—that is, only after
reforms have been initiated, not before.
Fourth, IMF secrecy is contrary to its proper role as a source of
independent, objective, and informed opinion about the economic
performance and financial risks of member countries. In pursuit
of its appropriate mission, any policies or conditions for assistance
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advocated by the IMF should be revealed publicly. Thatwill encourage
a lively debate about their merits, and permit critical evaluation of
their effectiveness.
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